We consider a key distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks which uses deployment knowledge. Deployment is modeled as a grid of hexagonal clusters, into centers of which the sensor nodes are dropped according to a given probability distribution (e.g. a Gaussian one). We consider sensor connectivity in a random intersection graph model, instead of the more commonly used in literature G(n, p) graph model. While the latter is easier to analyze, the former is much more suitable to modeling sensor network key distribution. We provide analytical, asymptotic results showing how to pick parameters (key pool size |S|, the number of chosen keys d) depending on the number of deployed nodes in order to assure global connectivity of the network, and estimate the diameter of the network for the given parameters.
monitoring, as well as security. Since the nodes are assumed to be as cheap as possible (with the so far unattained ideal being "smart dust"), and have limited energy capacity (batteries), they can not perform many operations nor standard protocols used to ensure security in more capable devices. Of particular interest is the problem of key distribution in wireless sensor networks, made difficult by lack of, or very limited, ability to perform public-key operations as well as vulnerability to node compromise-the nodes can not be tamper-resistant, so physical compromise of a node compromises all of its key material. Previous work in this area has mostly concentrated on the so-called random key predistribution methods, introduced by Eschenauer and Gligor [12] .
Numerous enhancements to the random key predistribution methods have been proposed, chief among them the utilization of Blom's scheme [2] to decrease the memory consumption and communication overhead as well as ensuring that as long as the number of compromised nodes remains under a certain threshold, the scheme remains secure [10] , or using polynomial-based threshold schemes [6] to achieve the same improvements [15] .
An interesting class of approaches to the problem has emerged, which aims to improve the properties of key distribution schemes by utilizing deployment knowledge, that is knowledge of the physical location of the nodes. The most commonly considered schemes make use of threshold key predistribution schemes based on Blom's scheme, and use a square deployment grid [11] . Only a few proposals exist for non-square deployment grid models with no analytical results but rather simulation ones, some utilizing Blom's scheme [17] , and some utilizing polynomial threshold schemes [14, 18] .
For analysis of local connectivity, that is communication inside the hexagonal cluster where all nodes are within wireless communication range, we use the random intersection graph model. It has only recently been used to model sensor network connectivity properties [5, 9] , and while it is more difficult to analyze, it represents the random predistribution model for sensor networks much more accurately than the G(n, p) model [12] previously used in literature. Our model and its analysis differ from [5, 9] in that nodes are not assigned keys from the common pool-two different nodes in one hexagonal cluster can have keys chosen from different pools if their intended deployment points were different. Although, due to their numerous applications, many other generalized models of random intersection graphs have been studied recently (for example [3, 4, 7, 8] ), all of them assume that each node chooses its keys from the same key pool. In our work we give preliminary results regarding connectivity and the diameter (the number of hops that messages have to pass through to travel through the network in the worst case) of the random intersection graph corresponding to the hexagonal cluster. We establish relations between the key pool size |S|, the number of chosen keys d and number of nodes, which ensures efficient communication in the cluster.
For analysis of global connectivity we will use the results of the local connectivity, and an estimation of probability of the possibility of communication between nodes in neighboring hexagons. We will therefore give asymptotic results showing how to pick parameters (key pool size |S|, the number of chosen keys d) depending on the number of deployed nodes in order to assure global connectivity of the network, and estimate the diameter of the network for the given parameters.
As far as we are aware, no analytical results for hexagonal random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks have previously appeared in literature. Moreover, we consider the random intersection graph as our theoretical model, which has never been considered in any random key predistribution scheme with deployment knowledge. We are also basing our considerations on a very general key distribution model in which the keys are simply chosen from a key pool, so the results should be applicable for many schemes derived from it.
Description of the model and results
Let s be the communication range of the sensor.
Let H = H(I, s) be the division of the deployment area into hexagons labeled by elements of I , each with edge length of s 2 . We will call H a hexagon grid (see Fig. 1 ) Let H + be H with added hexagons, adjacent to the border hexagons of H. To each of the hexagons in H and H + we will assign coordinates (i, j) ∈ I , and (i, j) ∈ I + , respectively (see Fig. 1 ). We will choose a key pool, uniformly at random, and then randomly divide the keys so that to each hexagon H i, j ∈ H + we assign a set S i, j of m keys. We will also attribute a set V i, j of N sensors to each hexagon H i, j ∈ H. Moreover, each sensor v ∈ V i, j will be deployed over a middle point of a hexagon H i, j . Thus, each sensor will be given coordinates on the plane. If the distance on the plane between sensors v and v will be at most s, i.e. d(v, v ) ≤ s, we will say that they are in communication range. We will assume that the place in the deployment area in which every sensor lands will be given according to some known distribution; in fact in this paper we will assume that we are able to estimate the lower bound on probabilities of the sensor landing in the intended hexagon, in the neighboring hexagon and within s of a midpoint between the center of the intended hexagon and its given neighbor. Usually, in location-aware schemes, in similar deployment scenarios, Gaussian distribution is considered [11, 16] .
Definition 1 Let H be a hexagon grid, H = H(I, s). The Wireless Sensor Network
) we will call a random graph with the vertex set
is a set of keys assigned to the vertex v, according to the following procedure: For every (i, j) ∈ I , every v ∈ V i j will be assigned a pool of d keys from each of the key pools 
Theorem 1 Let
< m, p be the lower bound on probability that a sensor lands in a hexagon over which it was deployed, and p the lower bound on probability that it lands in a hexagon over which it was deployed, and at the same time in a circle with a center point in the middle point of a given edge of this hexagon, and diameter s (see Fig. 3 ). Moreover let p be the lower bound on probability that a sensor lands in a given hexagon nearest to the deployment one. Then, with probability at least
and has diameter at most 2diam(H) + 3.
To give asymptotic result, we will assume that N → ∞. We will make use of the standard notation:
respectively. We will also assume that "with high probability" means with probability tending to one as N → ∞. We will also make natural assumptions that N / ln N = o(m) (which is even weaker than m ≥ N ) and b = b(H) = o(h) (which is natural, when deployment area is for example square-like and h = h(H) tends to infinity). 
where P = p + 6 p , p is the minimum probability that a sensor lands in a hexagon over which it was deployed, and p is the minimum probability that a sensor lands in a given hexagon neighboring the one over which it was deployed.
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will give preliminary definitions, notation and state simple facts used frequently in the proofs. The next two sections contain the proofs of the main theorems. Namely in Sect. 4 we prove Theorem 1 and in Sect. 2-Theorem 2. Both of them are divided in the same way. In the first subsection we prove a result for a given hexagon. In the second subsection we show that there is, with high probability, direct communication between neighboring hexagons and we conclude about the connectivity of G W SN . The last subsection gives remarks on applications and the security of the network.
Preliminary definitions and notation
Since first we will give results on local connectivity of the sensors which landed in one of the hexagons, we will slightly change the notation. For the simplicity of notation we will call the considered hexagon H 6 and surrounding hexagons H 0 , . . . , H 5 (see Fig. 2 ). Moreover we will be assuming that:
• N is the number of sensors deployed over one hexagon;
) is a set of sensors deployed over hexagon H i , which landed in hexagon H 6 , |V i | = n i • V is a set of sensors deployed over hexagons H 0 , . . . , H 6 , which landed in hexagon
is a set of keys attributed to sensors from A, where A ⊆ V;
In notation S i+ j , H i+ j , V i+ j addition i + j will be modulo 6 in a set {0, . . . , 5}.
Notice
] is a subgraph of G induced on the set of vertices V 1 .
Definition 3 Let H ∈ V (G(H)). Then G(H, d
) is a graph with a set of vertices V (corresponding to a set of those sensors deployed over H and neighboring hexagons which landed in H ) and a set of edges
, then in sensor network sensors v and v are in their communication range and can communicate using a common key. Notice that not all sensors who land in the hexagon H create vertices of graph
) is a good approximation of a part of the wireless sensor network, and in reality the sensor network may have even better connectivity properties than the theoretical model.
In the proofs we will extensively use the following simple facts without explicitly mentioning them:
Frequently, to prove that A = A(N ) happens with high probability (i.e. with probability tending to one as N → ∞), we first prove that event B occurs with high probability and then that, given B, A occurs with high probability since:
Finally, we will also use Chernoff bound (see Theorem 2.1 in [13] ). If X has binomial distribution, EX = λ, then
where the last inequality is true if t = o(λ).
Highly connected hexagonal grid
In this section we will concentrate on the highly connected sensor grids. These results are applicable to the case where N is relatively small. We will be interested in the case, when G(H, d) is almost a clique, i.e. most of the pairs of sensors in H may directly communicate. In fact we will give estimates on the probability that any two sensors in G(H, d) may communicate using at most 2 hops.
Local connectivity
Then with probability at least
) is connected and has diameter at most 2.
We will also make an assumption that N ≤ m. Let v, v ∈ V 6 and 2d < m, then we have
Therefore, with probability at least 1−
Hence for given v ∈ V 6 we have
Concluding, if d = √ m ln m , then with probability at least:
) is connected with diameter at most 2.
Global connectivity
Proof of Theorem 1 Consider two neighboring hexagons H i, j and H i, j+1 . Let R be the circle with diameter s and center right between H i, j and H i, j+1 (see Fig. 3 ). Let p be the lower bound on probability that a sensor deployed over H i, j will land in H i, j ∩ R (it is also the lower bound on probability that a sensor deployed over H i, j+1 will land in H i, j+1 ∩ R). Probability of event A, that no sensor which was deployed over H i, j is in H i, j ∩ R, or no sensor which was deployed over H i, j+1 is in H i, j+1 ∩ R is at most 2 1 − p N . Also, if we proceed similarly to previous calculation we can show that probability that two vertices -one which was deployed over H i, j and another which was deployed over H i, j+1 (assuming A c ) -will not be able to communicate directly, is at most
Thus, assuming connectivity of sensor network inside H i, j and H i, j+1 sensors from those hexagons can communicate with probability at least 1
Since there are h hexagons, from definition of p, with probability at least 1−h(1− p) N in all of them the corresponding V 6 are nonempty sets. From Theorem 3, if we sum over all deployment possibilities such that all sets V 6 = ∅, since there are h N sensors, we have that with probability at least:
are connected with diameter at most 2. Moreover there are at most 3h pairs of neighboring hexagons. Therefore the probability that G(H, d) (H ∈ H) are connected and any two neighboring hexagons can "communicate" is at least:
With probability given by (3) all the sensors which have landed in one of the hexagons from H, close to its deployment point (either inside the hexagon or inside one of its neighbors) are contained in one large connected component of G W SN . For any sensor deployed over the interior hexagon H , the probability that a sensor will land in one of the hexagons from H, close to its deployment point equals p + 6 p . For any border hexagon (see Fig. 4 ) this probability is smaller but at least p + 3 p . We 
Therefore from Chernoff bound:
The diameter of the largest component of G W SN depends on the number of hexagons in the grid. Notice that, with probability (3), for any hexagon H the graph G(H, d) [V 6 ] is a complete graph and for neighboring hexagons H i, j and H i, j+1 there is an edge which joins the vertices from those complete graphs attributed to the hexagons. Therefore, if information has to cross l hexagons, it will need at most 2l + 5 = 2(l + 1) + 3 ≤ 2diam(H) + 3 hops.
Conclusions and remarks
A typical sensor network could have the following parameters: As can be seen, connectivity of the large fraction of sensors is almost certain with sensible parameters. Let us briefly consider the security implications. An attack on a single hexagon does not impact faraway hexagons, unless the attacker can gain access to the keys stored in nodes originally intended to fall into those faraway hexagons. Let us assume that the attacker conducts a localized attack, that is they subvert several nodes in a given area-let us assume the worst case-all nodes in a given area are subverted.
The attacker will manage to get any information about hexagons which are far (more than two hexagons away) from the subverted one only if one of the nodes destined for those far hexagons instead fell into the subverted area. However, in real deployment scenarios, such occurrences will be relatively rare. Let us assume that the nodes are dropped according to the Gaussian distribution, with the center point in the center of every hexagon, and σ equal to half the size of a hexagon. Then, the probability of a sensor landing in a hexagon three hexagons away from its intended destination is ≈ 10 −8 , four…≈ 10 −14 , five…≈ 10 −22 , etc. Hence, the impact of subverting many nodes, even completely, on hexagons far from them is minimal for reasonable deployment parameters.
Effects of an attack are more dramatic for nodes closer by, because nodes in neighboring hexagons share parts of their keypools. The network is somewhat vulnerable to localized compromise-the attacker can subvert some of the nodes and obtain keys of the other nearby nodes. In our model, subverting n nodes from a given interior hexagon, will yield on average m(1 Let us assume some sensible deployment parameters, and that the attacker managed to compromise a third of the nodes in the hexagon: Note that the number of compromised keys in the given hexagon and its neighbor behaves similarly to a scheme without deployment knowledge, while two hexagons away the effects of a compromise are already considerably mitigated.
Connectivity of hexagonal grid-asymptotic results
For simplicity we will assume that the considered hexagon is not the border one. From now on, we will assume that N tends to infinity and h(N ) is a function tending to infinity slower than any function N ε for any given ε > 0.
Recall that p denotes the lower bound on the probability that a sensor deployed over H 6 lands in H 6 and p denotes the lower bound on the probability that a sensor deployed over H i (for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 5) lands in H 6 . In this section we will consider the worst case and assume that in the studied hexagon the lower bound is attained (i.e. p and p are the probabilities of landing in the appropriate hexagons). Let ω(N ) be any function tending to infinity such that ln ω(N ) = o(N ). Since n i (for 0 ≤ i ≤ 5) and n 6 have binomial distribution Bin(N , p ) and Bin(N , p), respectively, Chernoff bound implies:
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 5, and
Local connectivity for large N
In the proof of the local connectivity we will use a similar technique to the one used in [9] . However, we had to improve the method, since our case is more complex than the one presented in [9] . Namely we have different types of vertices and our bound is asymptotically tight up to a constant factor. During the work on final version of the article we became aware of the work by Blackburn and Gerke [1] . In the article, the authors present, asymptotically tight up to a constant factor, the result for the model presented in [9] . We think that our method is similar to this from [1] and we believe that it would allow to slightly shorten a proof from [1] .
Theorem 4 Let G(H, d) be defined as in Definition 3, N/ ln N = o(m). For any
ε > 0, (i) if lim sup N →∞ d 2 N m ln N 4 p + 20 p < (1 − ε), then with high probability G(H, d) is disconnected. (ii) if lim inf N →∞ d 2 N m ln N 4 p + 20 p > (1 + ε),
then with high probability G(H, d) is connected.
We will be interested in the second part of the theorem, but we state (i) without the proof for completeness of considerations and to show that our bound is asymptotically tight. In fact (i) can be proven by the second moment method if we consider carefully the key pools that the sensors share (see Fig. 5 ). The assumption of (i) then implies the existence of an isolated vertex. To prove part (ii), we will need two lemmas, which are shown in the next section.
Small components
Notice that assumptions that 
(ii) moreover, with probability 
. N γ = o(ω(N ) ) for some γ > 0, we have:
Let (A, V\
Denote by S a set of key pools attributed to hexagons H 0 , . . . , H 6 and the hexagons neighboring to them. Let moreover, for S ∈ S, I S = {i :
Then, from (4), (5) and (6), we know that with probability
For given S ∈ S and A ⊆ V denote by A A,S the event that:
for a given, arbitrarily chosen, constant c 3 and large N (uniformly over all A and S). Let us denote by B A,S the event that
and assume that (7) is fulfilled. Since each vertex chooses its keys from S independently of all other vertices, then:
for N large enough, all A and all S:
Now notice that (A, V\A) is empty if for all S ∈ S event B A,S occurs. Since keys from different key pools are chosen independently, if (7) is fulfilled and N is large enough, then (4), (5) and (7) for all A (|A| ≤ c 2 √ N ) we finally obtain:
.
Connectivity
Proof of Theorem 4 (ii) Take ε and N 0 such that 
Then, since d → ∞ for some δ > 0 and large N we have: 
. Therefore probability that G (H, d 1 ) produced from G(H, d 1 ) is disconnected is at most: 
From Theorem 4 for a given interior hexagon H with probability 1 − o(
) is connected. Moreover any two interior hexagons can "communicate" with probability 1 − o (   1   h(N ) ). Thus, if we sum over all interior hexagons (there are at most h(N ) of them) and all pairs of neighboring hexagons (there are at most 3h(N ) of them), we have that with high probability all the sensors which landed in interior hexagons neighboring to the one over which they were deployed are contained in the one large connected component of G W SN .
Let us denote now by A H the event that a given sensor deployed over H landed in the interior hexagon neighboring to H , or in H if it is an interior hexagon itself (see Fig. 4 ). We have to consider three cases. N (h(N ) − 2b(H))) .
Case 1 H and all its neighbors are interior hexagons (there are at least h(H ) − 2b(H) such hexagons). Then Pr{A
Therefore, having in mind that b(H) = o(h(N )) and that we can choose ω(N ) tending to infinity slowly enough, with high probability the following holds: (1) )N h(N )( p + 6 p ).
Remarks on security
A pertinent question in the case of asymptotic network size is: can the attacker compromise a constant fraction of connections between sensors, by capturing only o(h N ) sensors chosen uniformly at random. This notion was introduced in [9] as the redoubtability property, satisfied in a network if probability of such a large-scale compromise using a small number of sensors is tending to zero. Our reasoning will follow along the same lines as in [9] . Let us denote by a n b n that a n = O(b n ) and b n = O(a n ). Let us assume that d hm 1 h N , and that the attacker has compromised o(h N ) sensors. Therefore, the attacker possesses at most o(dh N ) = o(hm) keys. If two sensors have established communication, they must share a key, and the probability that this key is among those possessed by the attacker will be o (1) . Therefore, at most o(number of links) are compromised on average. This would be impossible if the attacker had been able to compromise a constant fraction of the links with positive probability, bounded away from 0, so it follows that this probability must tend to 0, and the network is redoubtable.
We have made an assumption that Since such values are quite reasonable, we see that the network has both "good" connectivity properties and is redoubtable.
Conclusions
We have provided analytical results for hexagonal random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks, using the random intersection graph as our theoretical model, which has not been previously considered in any random key predistribution scheme with deployment knowledge. The results should be applicable to many key distribution schemes based on the very basic one considered by us in which the keys are simply chosen from a key pool.
We have provided exact and asymptotic results for both local and global connectivity, showing how to choose key pool size |S|, and the number of chosen keys d depending on the number of deployed nodes to assure global connectivity of the network. We have also estimated the diameter of the network for the given parameters.
